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Abstract
In stroboscopic conditions––such as motion pictures––rotating objects may appear to rotate in the reverse direction due to
under-sampling (aliasing). A seemingly similar phenomenon occurs in constant sunlight, which has been taken as evidence that
the visual system processes discrete ‘‘snapshots’’ of the outside world. But if snapshots are indeed taken of the visual ﬁeld, then when
a rotating drum appears to transiently reverse direction, its mirror image should always appeared to reverse direction simultane-
ously. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that when observers watched a rotating drum and its mirror image, almost all illusory
motion reversals occurred for only one image at a time. This result indicates that the motion reversal illusion cannot be explained by
snapshots of the visual ﬁeld. The same result is found when the two images are presented within one visual hemiﬁeld, further ruling
out the possibility that discrete sampling of the visual ﬁeld occurs separately in each hemisphere. The frequency distribution of illu-
sory reversal durations approximates a gamma distribution, suggesting perceptual rivalry as a better explanation for illusory motion
reversal. After adaptation of motion detectors coding for the correct direction, the activity of motion-sensitive neurons coding for
motion in the reverse direction may intermittently become dominant and drive the perception of motion.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Does visual perception involve discrete or continuous
analysis of the outside world? This question has old
roots in the literature (Baer, 1864; James, 1890), and it
enjoyed renewed popularity with the advent of cinema-
tography––an obvious technological metaphor. To ex-
plain why asynchronous stimuli sometimes appear to
be synchronous, a number of investigators in the 1900s0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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analysis of a series of ‘‘perceptual moments’’ (Allport,
1968; Efron, 1970; Stroud, 1948; VanRullen & Koch,
2003). More recently, the subject of discrete processing
has fallen from favor, in part because a substantial frac-
tion of the literature on this topic, although provocative,
is not deﬁnitive.
One piece of evidence cited in support of discrete
processing (Crick & Koch, 2003; Koch, 2004; McComas
& Cupido, 1999; VanRullen & Koch, 2003) is a study by
Purves, Paydarfar, and Andrews (1996) entitled The
wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality, in which it
was reported that under constant light, both a spinning
wheel with spokes and a translating periodic pattern of
dots occasionally appeared to reverse direction. An
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ies, in which––due to the discrete snapshots of the cam-
era––the wheel can appear to be moving in the reverse
direction. Purves et al.s intriguing suggestion was that
the continuous light demonstration supported a quanti-
zation of perception––for example, in 100 ms batches.
They wrote, ‘‘The occurrence of this perception in the
absence of intermittent illumination suggests that we
normally see motion, as in movies, by processing a series
of visual episodes.’’ Crick and Koch concur, citing
Purves et al.s ﬁndings as an indication of ‘‘irregular
batch-like eﬀects in vision.’’ However, we suggest that
the relationship between the illusion reported by Purves
et al. and the cinematographic wagon-wheel eﬀect is
only superﬁcial, and the two eﬀects represent vastly dif-
ferent aspects of visual perception. Therefore, in this
manuscript we will refer to the reversal eﬀect under con-
tinuous light simply as illusory motion reversal (IMR).
If, as Purves et al. (1996) and other suggest, perception
is based on discrete samples, like frames in a movie, then
the perception of a spinning wheel under continuous
light should match the basic properties that deﬁne the
cinematographic wagon wheel eﬀect. Yet Purves et al.
observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the cinemato-
graphic wagon wheel eﬀect and the eﬀect in continuous
light. They acknowledge that under continuous illumi-
nation: (a) at a ﬁxed speed of rotation, the perception
of reversed motion does not occur stably, but instead
occurs transiently and for only a small fraction of the
viewing period, (b) the wheel never appears to come to
a stop, (c) when the wheel appears to reverse, it appears
to rotate at a faster speed than when moving in the for-
ward direction, and (d) the illusory appearance of extra
spokes occurs by the progressive addition of elements, in
contrast to the multiplication of the actual number of
spokes, as perceived in stroboscopic conditions. We
have veriﬁed points (a)–(c) in our own experiments (be-
low), although the perceived speed of reversed rotation
was often slower than that of orthograde rotation.
Observations (a)–(d) are suﬃcient to rule out discrete
perception as the explanation for the eﬀect. A proponent
of the snapshot hypothesis might explain observations
(a) and perhaps (b) by suggesting that the snapshot
interval need not be constant, but observations (c) and
(d) cannot be explained in this way. Further, observa-
tion (c)––the perceived increase in speed during illusory
motion reversal––speaks against the snapshot hypothe-
sis, which predicts that the reversed speed should always
be slower. The perceived speed of reversed rotation dur-
ing the wagon wheel eﬀect in movies cannot exceed the
wheels actual speed of forward rotation. We will discuss
other diﬀerences between IMR and the wagon wheel
illusion below.
We now oﬀer an alternative explanation for illusory
motion reversal under constant sunlight. Most models
of motion detection (Adelson & Bergen, 1985; van San-ten & Sperling, 1985) appeal to the activity of motion
detectors with properties similar to those of Reichardt
detectors (Reichardt, 1961). Brieﬂy, the detector re-
sponds to sequential changes in luminance at two points
in the visual ﬁeld (Fig. 1a). Such detectors are subject to
error when presented with moving periodic patterns of
the kind used by Purves et al. In particular, it is possible
for the detector tuned to motion in one direction to be
stimulated by motion in the opposite direction. Consider
Fig. 1a, in which the two dots moving to the left stimu-
late the rightward motion detector. This spurious activa-
tion of the detector for the wrong direction of motion,
sometimes called temporal aliasing, happens because
S1 occupies the receptive ﬁeld on the left and, soon after,
S2 moves into the receptive ﬁeld on the right. The detec-
tor has no way of knowing that S1 and S2 are diﬀerent
stimuli, and the pattern of excitation is identical to a sin-
gle stimulus moving to the right. Thus, in the absence of
any additional ﬁltering mechanisms (such as those
added by van Santen & Sperling (1985)), a detector sign-
aling rightward motion may be excited by leftward mo-
tion of a periodic pattern.
Schouten (1967) had previously described instances
of illusory motion reversal using a full radial grating
stimulus instead of a horizontally rotating drum. Con-
sistent with our interpretation, Schouten appealed to
the fact that Reichardt detectors are vulnerable to tem-
poral aliasing. Schouten, however, did not address the
observation that the percept of reversed motion is spo-
radic, nor did he examine the durations of IMRs. The
data presented below demonstrate similarities between
perceptual rivalry and illusory motion reversal, and we
therefore propose that the stimulated detectors for the
reverse-direction are in a rivalrous relationship with
the more highly stimulated forward-motion detectors,
yielding the occasional experience of reversed motion.
Motion opponency can be demonstrated by the motion
aftereﬀect (Eagleman, 2001; Wade & Verstraten, 1998),
in which a static pattern appears to slowly move in the
opposite direction to the previously viewed moving stim-
ulus. The motion aftereﬀect likely results from the adap-
tation of orthograde motion detectors; afterward, when
viewing a static stimulus, the spontaneous activity of ret-
rograde motion detectors exceeds that of the adapted
motion detectors, thereby driving the percept.
In models of motion perception (e.g. van Santen &
Sperling, 1985), the rightward Reichardt detector de-
picted in Fig. 1a is combined with a leftward detector,
and the perceived direction of motion is determined by
a subtraction stage in which the activity of the two
detectors is compared. In our proposal, (1) prolonged
viewing of leftward motion causes adaptation in the left-
ward-motion detector, and (2) the rightward-motion
detector is spuriously stimulated by temporal aliasing.
Due to rivalry between the opposite detectors––proba-
bly fueled by mutual inhibition––the rightward motion
Fig. 1. The motion reversal illusion. (a) The Reichardt motion detector (M) receives input from photoreceptors R1 and R2, which respond to
luminance change. Because there is a longer delay from R1 to M than from R2 to M, the detector will respond to an object moving to the right.
However, a periodic stimulus moving to the left can spuriously excite the detector if S1 excites R1 shortly before S2 excites R2. This error is
sometimes called temporal aliasing. (b) Schematic of stimulus. A rotating drum was presented under natural sunlight in a room next to large
windows, with all artiﬁcial lights turned oﬀ. Sixteen dots were aﬃxed to a drum of 148 mm diameter. Dots passed ﬁxation at 8.5 Hz. Eye position was
monitored with an Arrington research video-based eye tracker. (c) Observers held down a key for the duration that they perceived movement in the
retrograde direction. Data from most subjects were consistent with a gamma distribution (asterisks indicate signiﬁcant ﬁt; Kolmogorov–Smirnov
p>0.05), typical for phenomena of perceptual ambiguity. Best ﬁt parameters for the gamma distribution are shown. Bin width=500 ms. Distributions
of the durations of orthograde perceptions are inset for each subject.
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We will refer to this model as the rivalry hypothesis of
IMR. Note that we view this phenomenon as a relative
of the motion aftereﬀect: here the eﬀect of the adapta-
tion is to inﬂuence the perception not of a static pattern,
but rather the original moving pattern itself.2. Experiment 1: Illusory reversal of a rotating drum
To distinguish our rivalry hypothesis from the snap-
shot hypothesis of Purves et al., we had six observers ﬁx-
ate a small laser light positioned 1 below a rotating
white drum viewed from the side under sunlight. Evenly
spaced around the side of the drum were 16 black dots
(Fig. 1b, each dot subtended 0.82 visual angle, the
drum was 14.8 cm in diameter and subtended 13 fromTable 1
Data from individual subjects for Experiment I. Median and mode of IMR
duration of IMR expressed as percentage of total viewing time, best ﬁt gam
Observer Median (s) Mode (s) Time to ﬁrst reversal
AMK 0.620 0.750 67
BFI 3.220 1.250 104
CAS 2.012 0.250 16
DME 2.269 0.250 496
KAK 1.292 0.250 128
LCC 1.405 1.250 13the viewing distance of 63 cm). The drum rotated at
0.53 rps, and dots passed the point of ﬁxation at 8.5
Hz. Observers pressed a key each time they observed
illusory motion reversal, and held it down for the dura-
tion of the perception of reversed motion. Head move-
ments were minimized by the use of a chin rest, and
eye position was tracked.
For most subjects, the distributions of IMR dura-
tions were well ﬁt by a gamma distribution (Fig. 1c;
see raw data in Table 1). A gamma distribution typiﬁes
the dynamics of multistable perception as reported in
binocular rivalry (Lehky, 1988; Leopold & Logothetis,
1999; Levelt, 1965) and with ambiguous ﬁgures like
the Necker cube or shapes deﬁned by ambiguous shad-
ing (Taylor & Aldridge, 1974). We conﬁrmed a good
ﬁt to the gamma distribution in 4 of 6 subjects
(p>0.05, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test), but 2 ﬁts deviateddurations, viewing time before ﬁrst IMR was perceived, cumulative
ma distribution parameters a and b
(s) Cumulative reversal time (%) a b
2.4 2.51 0.290
11 2.27 1.65
17 2.53 0.774
10 1.51 1.80
2.5 2.11 0.621
14 3.42 0.496
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tions of orthograde motion perception ﬁt a gamma
distribution in 3 of 6 subjects (p>0.05; Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test; Fig. 1c insets). The shape of the gamma
distribution can be understood as expressing two ten-
dencies of multistable percepts: ﬁrst, the tendency to
change states at random which yields an exponential dis-
tribution (ekx) and second, the tendency to stay at the
current state, perhaps due to inertia or a refractory per-
iod (xr 1, ascending part of the curve). In the present
case, the proposed rivalry is not equiprobable, as in
the Necker cube, but is instead heavily biased toward
perceiving motion in the orthograde direction. In the
current study, we estimate an average 91±6% probabil-
ity of perceiving orthograde motion––in other words,
IMR was seen an average of 9% of the total viewing
time (see Table 1).
Interestingly, the amount of viewing time before the
illusion was ﬁrst seen was quite variable for the diﬀerent
observers (see Table 1). This highlights yet another dif-
ference between IMR and the wagon wheel illusion in
movies: in the latter, there is no period of prior ﬁxation
required for the perception of reversed motion.
In summary, the temporal pattern of motion reversals
is distributed in a way characteristic of rivalry. The
snapshot hypothesis, in contrast, has no reason to pre-
dict a gamma distribution. Further, if the sampling rateFig. 2. The motion reversal illusion with two identical drums. (a) All stimulus
provided the visual image of a second rotating drum. (b) Data from mirror e
only one drum reversing. Best ﬁt parameters for the gamma distribution are
number of data points. (c) Data from experiment in which the drum and its m
in which observers reported one and only one drum reversing. Distribution
points.were constant, the snapshot hypothesis should predict
continuous perception of the reverse direction. The spo-
radic nature of the illusion would require a rapidly
changing sampling rate.
For one subject, there seemed to be increased eye
movements after the oﬀset of IMR. Otherwise, we found
little relationship between eye movements and the onset
or oﬀset of IMR (data not shown). Also, some observers
reported supernumerary dots, although we did not ex-
plore the manner (multiplicative vs. additive) in which
these extra dots appeared.3. Experiment 2: Measuring illusory reversal of two
(mirrored) drums
The distributions of reversal durations observed in
experiment 1 support the possibility of rivalry as an
explanation for IMR, but by themselves they do not rule
out the snapshot hypothesis. To directly address the
snapshot hypothesis, we introduced a mirror to create
a second image of the rotating drum (Fig. 2a). The snap-
shot hypothesis predicts that both drums will appear to
reverse simultaneously, since discrete sampling of the vis-
ual ﬁeld should interact identically with the two drums.
Five observers ﬁxated a laser dot situated halfway be-
tween the two rotating images (viewing distance 63 cm;parameters were identical to Fig. 1, with the addition of a mirror which
xperiment. Percentage of reversals in which observers reported one and
inset. Distribution for 1 of the 5 subjects not shown due to insuﬃcient
irror image were positioned in same visual ﬁeld. Percentage of reversals
for 1 of the 3 subjects not shown due to insuﬃcient number of data
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visual angle). Observers held down one of three keys
for the duration of observed illusory reversal: one key
for perceived reversal of the actual drum, another for re-
versal of the mirror image, and a third for when both
stimuli were perceived to move in the reverse direction.
Durations of perceived motion reversal were well ﬁt
by a gamma distribution for 2 of 4 observers (Fig. 2a).
For the ﬁfth observer, an insuﬃcient number of data
points were collected for the goodness-of-ﬁt analysis.
Most importantly, observers almost never saw both
drums in IMR simultaneously (Fig. 2b). Instead, one
drum appeared to transiently reverse direction while
the other continued to rotate in the orthograde
direction.
For one participant, we computed the probability
that reversals would have occurred in both images
simultaneously by chance, assuming they were inde-
pendent events, by multiplying (sum of reversal dura-
tions/total time) for one image by (sum of reversal
durations/total time) for the other image. This yielded
a probability of 0.003 for observer LCC. Since this num-
ber is smaller than the actual amount of simultaneous
reversal reported by the subject (25% of all illusory epi-
sodes occurred in both images simultaneously), this
could hint at cooperativity between the perceptions of
the two drums; however, there is insuﬃcient data to
draw a ﬁrm conclusion. Observers BFI and KAK saw
single-drum reversals in only the mirror image. Data
representing the stimulus in which IMR was perceived
was not recorded for observers DME and CAS,
although they verbally reported having seen solitary
reversals of each stimulus.
We note that the mirror image was slightly smaller
because of the angle of the mirror (<2% diﬀerence);
however, the frequency of stimulus presentation re-
mained identical. Purves et al. report that the temporal
frequency of the stimuli, rather than linear velocity or
stimulus size, was the major determinant of perceived
motion reversal. In the framework of the snapshot
hypothesis, slight diﬀerences in stimulus size are irrele-
vant, and equal frequencies of stimulus presentations
should cause illusory motion reversal in both images
simultaneously.4. Experiment 3: Two drums in the same visual hemiﬁeld
The above results challenge the hypothesis that the
global visual scene is processed in discrete snapshots.
However, since the two rotating drums appeared in dif-
ferent halves of the visual ﬁeld, the independence of the
two drums could be theoretically accommodated by the
snapshot theory if the two hemispheres sampled the vis-
ual scene independently. To address this possibility, we
replicated the experiment with both drums presentedin the same visual ﬁeld by orienting the stimulus verti-
cally, 1 to the right of ﬁxation (Fig. 2c). As in the pre-
vious experiment, illusory reversals of one drum were
usually perceived independently of reversals of the other
drum (Fig. 2c), indicating that hemisphere-speciﬁc
clocking also cannot explain IMR. Assuming IMR
occurs independently in the two images, for observers
BFI and CAS there was a 6.4·104 and 1.0·104 prob-
ability, respectively, that IMR would have occurred in
both images simultaneously by chance. The fact that ob-
server BFI perceived reversals simultaneously 34% of
the time indicates that for observer BFI, the reversals
did not occur independently. However, even for obser-
ver BFI the incidence of simultaneous reversals fell far
short of the 100% ﬁgure predicted by the snapshot
hypothesis.5. Discussion
In summary, our results replicate previous ﬁndings of
illusory motion reversal under constant illumination
(Purves et al., 1996; Schouten, 1967), show that the illu-
sion is compatible with patterns of perceptual rivalry
(Fig. 1c), and rule out global or hemispheric snapshots
of the visual ﬁeld as an explanation for the eﬀect (Fig.
2). Our data do not necessarily rule out object-based
snapshots. However, the IMR observed in this study
and others (Purves et al., 1996; Schouten, 1967) is con-
siderably diﬀerent from the wagon wheel illusion seen
in movies in numerous ways (reviewed in the Introduc-
tion), which leaves discrete sampling theories dubious.
Instead of perceptual snapshots, competition between
opponent motion detectors––leading to perceptual riv-
alry––is perhaps the most parsimonious explanation
for IMR. Consistent with a ‘‘winner-take-all’’ system
of competing neural populations, prolonged viewing of
a rotating drum yields alternating percepts of veridical
motion or reverse motion. The approximate gamma dis-
tribution of reversal durations supports our hypothesis
of rivaling opponent motion systems, since the durations
of percepts ﬁt the gamma distribution in studies of riv-
alry using stimuli that yield both equiprobable (e.g.
face/vase, Necker cube) and non-equiprobable percep-
tual interpretations (Levelt, 1965; Murata, Matsui,
Miyauchi, Kakita, & Yanagida, 2003).
A failure to see illusory motion reversals in continu-
ous illumination was recently reported by Pakarian
and Yasamy (2003), who asked observers to view a peri-
odic rotating stimulus in both stroboscopic and contin-
uous illumination. As emphasized above, the percepts
elicited under these two conditions are quite diﬀerent,
and an expectation that the continuous illusion would
be similar to the stroboscopic may have misled Pakarian
and Yasamy into viewing the stimulus too brieﬂy to
experience the illusion. The stroboscopic wagon wheel
2658 K. Kline et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 2653–2658eﬀect is perceived immediately upon viewing an appro-
priate stimulus, whereas IMR requires variable periods
of observation (between 13 s and 8 min for our subjects,
see Table 1), during which adaptation is proposed to
occur prior to the illusions ﬁrst occurrence. However,
in accord with Pakarian and Yasamy, one of our observ-
ers failed to see any illusory motion reversals. Another
subject who did see reversals in the single drum condi-
tion did not see reversals in the second experimental
condition with two rotating images. The reason for
some subjects inability to see IMR, and the variability
of the initial observation time required for those who
do see it, is unknown.
Most recent arguments for quantized perception have
relied on the ﬁndings of Purves et al. (1996) as well as
Varela, Toro, John, and Schwartz (1981), who reported
that the phase of cortical alpha rhythms determined
whether subjects perceived two sequential dots as one
or two separate stimuli (Varela et al., 1981). However,
Varela later softened his claims about this ﬁnding
(Gho & Varela, 1988), and more recent attempts to rep-
licate the Varela et al. (1981) result have failed (Eagl-
eman, unpublished data; VanRullen & Koch, 2003).
Other psychological evidence (Arnold & Johnston,
2003; Burle & Bonnet, 1997; Geissler, Schebera, & Kom-
pass, 1999; Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990)
is consistent with local temporal oscillations in visual
processing, but does not at all imply that visual process-
ing occurs in discrete snapshots. Thus, while quantized
perception cannot be ruled out, there currently exists lit-
tle meaningful evidence in support of it.Acknowledgments
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